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Equality and Singapore’s First Constitutional 
Challenges to the Criminalization of Male 
Homosexual Conduct 
Lim Meng Suang and another v Attorney-General [2015] 1 
SLR 26 
 
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee* 
In 2013, in Lim Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon v Attorney-
General 1  and Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General 2  the High Court of 
Singapore delivered the first judgments in the jurisdiction considering the 
constitutionality of section 377A of the Penal Code, which criminalizes acts of 
“gross indecency” between two men, whether they occur in public or private. 
The Court ruled that the provision was not inconsistent with the guarantees of 
equality before the law and equal protection of the law stated in Article 12(1) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. The result was upheld in 
2014 by the Court of Appeal in Lim Meng Suang and another v Attorney-
General3 with slight differences in the reasoning. This article examines the 
courts’ analysis of equality law, and submits in particular that the courts 
ought to re-evaluate whether they should apply a presumption of 
constitutionality, refuse to assess the legitimacy of the object of the impugned 
provision, and rely on a standard of mere reasonableness or lack of 
arbitrariness when determining if a rational relation exists between the 
provision’s object and the differentia underlying a classification used in the 
provision. 
 
IN 2013 THE SINGAPORE HIGH COURT (HC), delivering the first judgments in the 
jurisdiction stemming from a constitutional challenge to a statutory provision 
criminalizing male gay sex, ruled that the provision does not violate Article 12(1) of 
                                                   
*  LLB (Hons) (Nat’l University of Singapore), LLM (UCL, Lond), PhD (B’ham); Advocate & Solicitor 
(Singapore), Solicitor (England & Wales); Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore 
Management University. While I was consulted on a pro bono basis by the plaintiffs’ counsels in 
the High Court cases under review, the views expressed herein are my own. I would like to thank 
Vicki C Jackson and Eva Brems for having reviewed an earlier version of this article for the IX 
World Congress of Constitutional Law in Oslo, Norway, 16–20 June 2014. 
1  Lim Meng Suang v Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 (HC) (Lim 
Meng Suang (HC)). 
2  Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 (HC) (Tan Eng Hong (merits)). 
3  Lim Meng Suang and another v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA) (Lim Meng Suang (CA)). 
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the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (the Constitution),4 which guarantees 
that ‘[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the 
law’. 
The first judgment to be handed down, Lim Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee 
Mun-Leon v Attorney-General, 5  was not the first challenge to the provision in 
question, section 377A of the Penal Code6 which states: 
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission 
of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, 
any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years. 
In September 2010, a man named Tan Eng Hong who had been charged with a 
section 377A offence for engaging in oral sex with another man in a public toilet 
cubicle in a shopping centre applied to the HC to impugn the constitutionality of the 
provision. Although the HC found7 that he lacked standing to bring the case because 
the original charge had been withdrawn and substituted with a charge under section 
294(a) for committing an obscene act in a public place, which he had pleaded guilty 
to, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (CA), Singapore’s final appellate 
court.8 
In the meantime, Lim Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon, who were 
described as being ‘in a romantic and sexual relationship’, 9  filed their own 
application contending that section 377A infringes the Constitution. Lim and Chee’s 
application was heard by Justice Quentin Loh in mid-February 2013, and shortly 
thereafter, at the beginning of March, his Honour also heard Tan’s substantive 
application, Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General. 10  The judgments in Lim Meng 
Suang and Tan Eng Hong were respectively issued on 9 April and 2 October 2013. 
The cases were then heard on appeal together in July and August 2014, and on 28 
October 2014 in Lim Meng Suang and another v Attorney-General11 the Court of 
Appeal upheld the results of the cases below with some differences in the reasoning. 
This article focuses on the analysis of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
in Lim Meng Suang at the HC and CA levels, since in the HC judgment of Tan Eng 
Hong the judge largely followed his own reasoning in the earlier Lim Meng Suang 
decision, though he did deal with additional points raised by the plaintiff’s counsel. 
Save as they have a bearing upon equal protection, I will not be examining arguments 
raised in Tan Eng Hong and in Lim Meng Suang at the CA level on the alleged 
breach of Article 9(1) of the Constitution which protects the rights to life and 
personal liberty.12 
In reaching its decisions in the two cases, the HC was bound to follow earlier 
pronouncements by the CA on how Article 12(1) should be interpreted, notably in the 
1998 case of Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong.13 While the section 377A cases 
shed new light on Article 12(1), the HC felt constrained by Taw Cheng Kong to apply 
                                                   
4  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Rep) (The Constitution). 
5  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1). 
6  Penal Code, Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed. 
7  Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2011] 3 SLR 320 (HC). 
8  Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) (Tan Eng Hong (standing)). 
9  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 122, [2]. 
10  Tan Eng Hong (merits) (n 2). 
11  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3). 
12  See generally, ibid 42–45, [42]–[53]; and Tan Eng Hong (merits) (n 2), 1068–1090, [22]–[84]. 
13  Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 (CA) (Taw Cheng Kong (CA)). 
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a standard of mere reasonableness or lack of arbitrariness in various contexts, such 
as when applying a presumption of constitutionality, assessing the legitimacy of the 
object of the impugned provision, and determining if a rational relation exists 
between the provision’s object and the differentia underlying a classification used in 
the provision. The CA largely affirmed this reasoning, and I submit that the outcome 
of the cases was primarily due to the adoption of this strict standard. However, the 
CA went further than the HC did, stating the law in a way that severely restricts its 
own discretion and forecloses the striking down of all but the most extreme cases of 
discrimination. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION TEST, AND 
DIFFERENTIATING EFFECT 
A good starting point for an analysis of Article 12(1) of the Constitution is the CA’s 
judgment in Taw Cheng Kong, which set out the applicable test in the following 
terms:14 
(a) The first question to be asked is, is the law discriminatory, and that the 
answer should then be – if the law is not discriminatory, it is good law, but if 
it is discriminatory, then because the prohibition of unequal protection is not 
absolute but is either expressly allowed by the constitution or is allowed by 
judicial interpretation, we have to ask the further question, is it allowed? If it 
is, the law is good, and if it is not the law is void. 
(b) Discriminatory law is good law if it is based on ‘reasonable’ or 
‘permissible’ classification, provided that 
(i) the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which 
distinguishes persons that are grouped together from others left out of 
the group; and 
(ii) the differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be 
achieved by the law in question. The classification may be founded on 
different bases such as geographical, or according to objects or 
occupations and the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus 
between the basis of classification and the object of the law in question. 
(c) In considering Art 8 there is a presumption that an impugned law is 
constitutional, a presumption stemming from the wide power of classification 
which the legislature must have in making laws operating differently as 
regards different groups of persons to give effect to its policy. 
While the Court of Appeal approved this test, it preferred to reserve the adjective 
‘discriminatory’ for laws and executive acts that contravene Article 12, and directed 
that those which do not should simply be referred to as having a ‘differentiating’ 
effect.15 
The passage above was a quotation from Malaysian Bar v Government of 
Malaysia,16 a decision of the Supreme Court of Malaysia based on Article 8(1) of the 
Malaysian Constitution which is identical to Article 12(1) of the Singapore 
                                                   
14  ibid 508, [58]. 
15  ibid 508, [59]. 
16  Malaysian Bar v Government of Malaysia [1987] 2 MLJ 165 (Sup Ct, Malaysia) 170. 
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Constitution.17 The Malaysian courts had themselves adopted the test applied by the 
Supreme Court of India to Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, 18  which had 
ultimately applied the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States (US) in 
Southern Railway Co v Greene19 regarding the Fourteenth Amendment to the US 
Constitution.20 Notably, the US case had been decided in 1910. This was before the 
1938 appearance of Justice Harlan Stone’s Footnote Four in United States v 
Carolene Products Co21 which suggested the application of a stricter standard of 
scrutiny where the government has classified persons in a way that offends 
fundamental rights in the Constitution (such as those set out in the first ten 
Amendments) or where such a classification results from ‘prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities’,22 as well as the Supreme Court’s adoption of the standard in 
subsequent cases. In Greene itself, the Court held that an Alabama law violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it required only out-of-state corporations to pay an 
annual franchise tax to the state. The case involved neither discrete or insular 
minorities, nor a breach of other fundamental constitutional rights. 
When determining if Tan Eng Hong possessed standing, the Singapore CA 
applied a simpler restatement of the test:23 
[A] differentiating measure prescribed by legislation would be consistent with 
Art 12(1) only if: 
(a) the classification was founded on an intelligible differentia; and 
(b) the differentia bore a rational relation to the object sought to be 
achieved by the law in question. 
The CA applied this version of the test in Lim Meng Suang.24 It abridges paragraph 
(a) of the passage from Taw Cheng Kong to a mere mention that the legislatively 
prescribed measure must be ‘differentiating’, but this is nonetheless a reminder that 
no claim pursuant to Article 12(1) can succeed unless the claimant can show prima 
                                                   
17  Singapore was a state of Malaysia between 1963 and 1965. Upon achieving full independence, it 
adopted various provisions of the Malaysian Constitution, including Art 8(1), into its own 
Constitution by way of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965, No 9 of 1965, 1985 Rev 
Ed, s 6(1). 
18  Malaysian Bar (n 16) 170, citing Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 
155 FC (Malaysia) 165–166, which cited Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S R Tendolkar 
AIR 1958 SC 538, [1959] SCR 279 (SC, India) 296–297. Art 14 of the Indian Constitution reads: 
‘The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws 
within the territory of India.’ 
19  Southern Railway Co v Greene 216 US 400 (1910) (SC). 
20  Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia (n 18), [1959] SCR at 296–297, citing Budhan Choudhry v State of 
Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191, [1955] 1 SCR 1045 (SC, India) 1048–1049, which cited (among others) 
Chiranjit Lal v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41, [1950] SCR 869 (SC, India) 932, which in turn 
cited Greene: ‘While reasonable classification is permitted, without doing violence to the equal 
protection of the laws, such classification must be based upon some real and substantial 
distinction, bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which such 
classification is imposed, and classification cannot be arbitrarily made without any substantial 
basis. Arbitrary selection, it has been said, cannot be justified by calling it classification.’ See ibid 
417. 
21  United States v Carolene Products Co 304 US 144 (1938) (SC) 152, n 4. 
22  ibid. 
23  Tan Eng Hong (standing) (n 8), 525, [124], citing Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 
SLR 489 (CA) (Yong Vui Kong (2010)) 536, [109]. 
24  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 48, [60]. It was also applied by the HC: Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 
126, [18]. 
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facie that the measure treats him or her differently from people in comparable 
classes.25 By this token, it is logically wrong to conclude that if the measure treats the 
claimant the same as other members of the class to which he or she belongs, Article 
12(1) is not infringed.26 In Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v Public Prosecutor,27 the HC 
appeared to have committed this error. The Ministry of Home Affairs had 
deregistered the Singapore Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1972 pursuant to 
the Societies Act28 on the ground that it was being used for purposes ‘prejudicial to 
public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore’.29 Subsequently, in the mid-1990s, 
the appellants were convicted under the Act by a District Court for having attended a 
meeting of an unlawful society or for knowingly allowing their premises to be used 
for the meeting of an unlawful society. Responding to the appellants’ contention that 
their prosecutions had breached their right to equality, the HC held that ‘all 
Jehovah’s Witnesses who fell foul of the same law were equally treated and there 
could be no complaint that some were treated more favourably than others’.30 
Similarly, in Taw Cheng Kong, the CA held that the legislative measure in 
question ‘would not offend the equality provision because the section would apply to 
all Singapore citizens as a class’.31 The judge in Lim Meng Suang accepted that this 
reasoning was tautologous,32 and emphasized the need to focus on the ‘fundamental 
rubric’ that ‘like should be treated alike’.33 I submit that this is in line with the need 
to show that members of the class of persons to which the claimant belongs have 
been treated differently from members of one or more comparable classes.34 
One last point – it would arguably make more sense to consider if a legislative 
measure has a differentiating effect after determining if the classification is based on 
an intelligible differentia. I will examine the intelligible differentia stage of the 
                                                   
25  The CA noted that ‘the “reasonable classification” test is not even engaged if the impugned statute 
is not discriminatory in the first place’: Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 47, [57]. 
26  See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, ‘The Equal Protection of the Laws’ (1949) 37 Cal L Rev 
341, 345; S[u] M[ien] Huang-Thio, ‘Equal Protection and Rational Classification’ [1963] Pub L  
412, 418–422. 
27  Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570 (HC). 
28  Societies Act, Cap 311, 1985 Rev Ed; now 2014 Rev Ed. 
29  ibid, s 24(1)(a). 
30  Kok Hoong Tan Dennis (n 27), 578, [33]; see also 580, [40]: ‘[T]here was no discrimination 
within the class, ie all members of the SCJW who had been found to have violated the Societies 
Act or Order 179 were treated similarly’. 
31  Taw Cheng Kong (CA) (n 13), 514, [82] (original emphasis). The impugned measure was s 37(1) of 
the Prevention of Corruption Act, Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed (PCA), which stated: ‘The provisions of 
this Act have effect, in relation to citizens of Singapore, outside as well as within Singapore; and 
where an offence under this Act is committed by a citizen of Singapore in any place outside 
Singapore, he may be dealt with in respect of that offence as if it had been committed in 
Singapore.’ 
32  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 140–144, [57]–[60], relying on Tan Yock Lin, ‘Equal Protection, 
Extra-Territoriality and Self-Incrimination’ (1998) 19 Sing L Rev 10, 18–19. 
33  ibid 144, [61]. The idea that ‘like should be treated alike’ has been traced to Aristotle. See, for 
example, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk V, Ch III, Bekker number 1131a23–24: ‘[I]f the persons are not 
equal, they will not have equal shares; it is when equals possess or are allotted unequal shares, or 
persons not equal equal shares, that quarrels and complaints arise.’ (Aristotle; H Rackham 
(transl), The Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; London: William 
Heinemann, 1934), Vol 19.) 
34  See Ng Chye Huay v Public Prosecutor [2006] 1 SLR(R) 157 (HC) 169–170, [37]–[38], for an 
example of a case in which paragraph (a) of the Taw Cheng Kong passage was not satisfied. The 
appellants, who were Falungong practitioners, failed to prove that subsidiary legislation requiring 
a permit to be obtained from the police to hold a public assembly discriminated against them by 
treating them differently from other people. The HC found that the legislation applied equally to 
all persons seeking to hold public assemblies. 
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reasonable classification test later.35 Nonetheless, it is evident that if a class is so 
poorly defined that one cannot tell with certainty as to who belongs to the class, then 
it is pointless to talk about whether members of the class have been treated 
differently from members of comparable classes. 
II. DEFINITION OF THE CLASSIFICATION 
The next step of the reasonable classification test – limb (a) of the test in Lim Meng 
Suang, which was also mentioned in paragraph (b)(i) of the Taw Cheng Kong 
passage – is the need to see if the classification employed by the government is based 
on an ‘intelligible differentia’. This is lawyerese for requiring the classification to be 
defined by clearly understandable characteristics. As the HC in Lim Meng Suang put 
it: ‘“Intelligible” means something that may be understood or is capable of being 
apprehended by the intellect or understanding, as opposed to by the senses. 
“Differentia” is used in the sense of a distinguishing mark or character, some 
attribute or feature by which one is distinguished from all others.’36 This step was 
well explained by Judge of Appeal M Karthigesu when he sat as a High Court judge in 
the case of Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor:37 
[T]here must be a consistent means of identifying the persons discriminated 
against, for example, gender, age, race, religion, seniority of professional 
qualification or area of residence. If there is no common identifying feature, 
then the discrimination violates… arbitrariness and the statute is invalid. If 
there is an intelligible differentia, then the discrimination is not arbitrary in 
this sense and it is necessary to proceed to the [next] stage. 
This limb of the test does not usually appear to pose much difficulty for executive or 
legislative classifications. Indeed, in Lim Meng Suang the CA said it would be ‘very 
seldom’ that a classification would fail limb (a) as it ‘connotes… a relatively low 
threshold that ought to avoid any consideration of substantive moral, political and/or 
ethical issues because these issues are potentially (and in most instances, actually) 
controversial’.38 It explained the intelligible differentia requirement in the following 
terms:39 
[T]he differentia embodied in the impugned statute must not only identify a 
clear distinguishing mark or character, but must also be intelligible (as 
opposed to illogical and/or incoherent). … [W]e are of the view that a 
differentia which is capable of being understood… may nevertheless still be 
unintelligible to the extent that it is so unreasonable as to be illogical and/or 
incoherent. We recognise that this last-mentioned proposition may open the 
doors to potential abuse, so we include the caveat that the illogicality and/or 
incoherence must be of an extreme nature. It must be so extreme that no 
reasonable person would ever contemplate the differentia concerned as being 
functional as intelligible differentia. 
                                                   
35  See the next part of the article, ‘Definition of the Classification’ (Pt II), below. 
36  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 135–136, [47], cited in Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 50, [65]. 
37  Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 (HC) (Taw Cheng Kong (HC)) 94, [33]. 
This decision was overruled by the CA, but the CA did not disapprove of the passage cited: Taw 
Cheng Kong (CA) (n 13). 
38  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 49–50, [65] (emphasis omitted). 
39  ibid 50, [67] (original emphasis). 
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This passage is significant as it indicates that limb (a) incorporates a ‘limited 
requirement of legitimacy’.40 The Court explained in the subsequent case of Yong Vui 
Kong v Public Prosecutor (2015) that ‘a law which adopts a manifestly 
discriminatory object would not pass muster under the first limb of the test. The 
differentiating factor used in such a law might be intelligible in the sense that it 
clearly distinguishes those covered by the law from those not covered by the law; but 
it would be “unintelligible” in the sense that no reasonable person would consider 
such a differentiating factor to be functional as an intelligible differentia.’41 This 
explains why the Court claimed that the differentia embodied in a law banning all 
women from driving might arguably be illogical and/or incoherent under limb (a)42 – 
while it is obvious which class of persons would be affected by the law (women who 
wish to drive), the differentia used may be unintelligible because it arguably makes 
no sense to ban women from driving. 
The Court defined the intelligible differentia requirement in a manner highly 
deferential to the Government. This reflected the Court’s concern that it should not 
become a ‘mini-legislature’,43 a point it repeated many times in its judgment. Since it 
is not really in doubt who section 377A affects, it is hardly surprising that the CA 
agreed with the HC judge’s view that:44 
[I]t is quite clear that the classification prescribed by s 377A – viz, male 
homosexuals or bisexual males who perform acts of ‘gross indecency’ on 
another male – is based on an intelligible differentia. It is also clear from the 
differentia in s 377A that the section excludes male-female and female-female 
acts. There is little difficulty identifying who falls within this classification and 
who does not. 
The plaintiffs had submitted that the vagueness of the term gross indecency meant 
either that the classification used in section 377A was not based on an intelligible 
differentia, or that the provision might be applied arbitrarily. This point was tersely 
dealt with by the HC, which held that the contention was ‘without… substantiation’, 
and that simply because ‘there is some width in the interpretation of this term… does 
not in itself make s 377A unconstitutional’ – the terms gross and indecent are ‘not 
unknown in our criminal law’.45 
When arguing that section 377A violates fundamental rules of natural justice 
and the rule of law, the plaintiff in Tan Eng Hong also suggested that the breadth of 
the term gross indecency violated the intelligible differentia requirement of the 
reasonable classification test. 46  He submitted it was uncertain whether acts of 
‘kissing, holding of hands, or even merely hugging’ constituted offences. The HC 
remained unpersuaded, taking the view that just because a statutory provision is 
seldom invoked does not necessarily render it vague and uncertain, because its 
meaning may be developed through case law. 47  Moreover, looking at the 
                                                   
40  ibid 57, [84] (emphasis omitted), cited in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 1129 
(CA) (Yong Vui Kong (2015)) 1173, [106]. 
41  Yong Vui Kong (2015), ibid 1173, [106]. 
42  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 70, [114]. 
43  ibid 52, [70], and 54, [77]. 
44  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 136, [48], approved in Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 68–69, [110]–
[111]. 
45  Lim Meng Suang (HC), ibid 173–174, [132]. 
46  Tan Eng Hong (merits) (n 2), 1089, [80]. 
47  ibid 1089, [82]. 
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considerations which existed at the time section 377A was introduced in 1938 (a 
point that will be dealt with later), 
there is at least an arguable case that the conduct in the hypothetical 
example… would not constitute an offence under s 377A. In fact, it is quite 
telling that none of the more than a hundred case authorities cited… was of a 
decision by the Singapore court convicting two males for kissing, holding 
hands or hugging.48 
I suggest that for the differentia of a classification to be unintelligible for failing to 
unmistakably identify who belongs to the class, it would have to lack a clear judicial 
definition at the time of assessment. Furthermore, as the judge alluded to in Tan Eng 
Hong, the differentia would have to be so subjective and inherently vague as to be 
incapable of clear definition in the future. It is quite hard to think of a truly 
unintelligible differentia, but perhaps physical attractiveness might be an example.49 
On balance, it is submitted that the HC correctly concluded that the term 
gross indecency was not so vague as to cause section 377A to be based upon an 
unintelligible differentia in this sense. In Ng Huat v Public Prosecutor50 the Court 
had laid down the standard for determining what amounts to a grossly indecent act, 
explaining that it 
must depend on whether in the circumstances, and the customs or morals of 
our times, it would be considered grossly indecent by any right-thinking 
member of the public… . The court does not sit to impose its own moral 
standards or precepts, but to enforce the morals of the general public.51 
Guidance may also be sought from judgments in successful prosecutions brought 
under section 377A (all of which so far have involved non-consensual acts);52 and 
from cases involving the equivalent provisions in the United Kingdom (UK) – section 
11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 188553 and, later, section 13 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 195654 – and in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
                                                   
48  ibid 1089–1090, [83]. 
49  It may be recalled that in 1995 Andrea Guglieri, the mayor of the town of Diano Marina on the 
Italian Riviera, sparked off what Italian newspapers called the ‘Bikini Wars’ by discouraging ‘ugly 
women’ from wearing bikinis in public: see, for example, ‘The Odd, Strange & Curious: Bikini War 
on Riviera’, Daily News (Kingsport, Tennessee, 16 August 1995), vol 24, no 119, at 11 
<https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1241&dat=19950816&id=Z31TAAAAIBAJ&sjid=IIY
DAAAAIBAJ&pg=6529,5554315&hl=en> (accessed 17 May 2015). 
50  Ng Huat v Public Prosecutor [1995] 2 SLR(R) 66 (HC). 
51  ibid 76, [27], citing R v K & H (1957) 21 WWR 86 (SC, Alberta, Canada). 
52  Public Prosecutor v Chan Mun Chiong [2008] SGDC 189 (DC) (fellatio); Ng Huat (n 50), Public 
Prosecutor v N [2004] SGDC 52 (DC); Public Prosecutor v Rahim bin Basron [2010] 3 SLR 278 
(HC) (the last three cases involved touching the penis). Anal intercourse, which was an offence 
under the former s 377 of the Penal Code (voluntary carnal intercourse against the order of nature 
with any man, woman or animals: see, for example, Kanagasuntharam v Public Prosecutor [1991] 
2 SLR(R) 874 (Ct of Crim Appeal); and Lim Hock Hin Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 
37 (CA)) until it was repealed with effect from 1 February 2008, would presumably also amount to 
gross indecency. 
53  UK Criminal Amendment Act 1885, 48 & 49 Vict, c 69. 
54  UK Sexual Offences Act 1956, c 59 (amended by the Sexual Offences Act 1967, c 60, s 1, to 
decriminalize homosexual acts in private). Some cases include R v Hunt [1950] 2 All ER 291, 301 
(two men in a shed both ‘making filthy exhibitions the one to the other’ without physical contact) 
and R v Preece [1977] QB 370 (CA) (two men watching each other masturbating through a hole in 
a partition between lavatory cubicles). The Wolfenden Report stated: ‘From the reports we have 
seen and the other evidence we have received it appears that the offence usually takes one of three 
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What is less clear is whether the CA went on to consider if the classification in 
section 377A is intelligible in the logical sense. It concluded that section 377A is 
neither illogical nor incoherent, because if it was ‘there would have been no basis 
upon which the parties on each side of this cavernous divide could have joined issue 
in the first place’.55 However, there did not appear to be any real assessment of 
whether the object of the section is manifestly discriminatory. Indeed, rather 
puzzlingly, the Court said it would not be appropriate for it to do so, a point 
examined below.56 
III. RATIONAL RELATION BETWEEN DIFFERENTIA OF CLASSIFICATION AND 
STATUTORY OBJECT 
As mentioned above, the main issue in most Article 12(1) cases mostly concerns limb 
(b) of the test in Lim Meng Suang, which appeared in paragraph (b)(ii) of the Taw 
Cheng Kong passage. This requires the court to ascertain the statutory object, and 
the standard of review it will apply when determining the rationality of the relation 
between the differentia of the classification employed in the impugned provision and 
the statutory object. 
A. ASCERTAINING THE STATUTORY OBJECT – RELIANCE ON EXTRINSIC MATERIALS 
Prior to Taw Cheng Kong and Lim Meng Suang, courts sometimes declared what the 
statutory objects were without explicitly identifying how they had ascertained them. 
Most likely the object of an Act or a specific provision thereof was simply determined 
by considering the effect of the provisions in the Act.57 For example, in Ong Ah 
Chuan v Public Prosecutor,58 provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act 197359 imposed 
the mandatory death sentence on people convicted of trafficking in 15 or more grams 
of heroin. The appellants, who had been duly convicted and sentenced to death, 
submitted that the provisions offended Article 12(1) ‘since it compels the court to 
condemn to the highest penalty of death an addict who has gratuitously supplied an 
addict friend with 15g of heroin from his own private store, and to inflict a lesser 
punishment upon a professional dealer caught selling for distribution to many 
addicts a total of 14.99g’.60 The Privy Council, then Singapore’s final appellate court, 
held that the ‘social object’ of the Act ‘is to prevent the growth of drug addiction in 
Singapore by stamping out the illicit drug trade and, in particular, the trade in those 
most dangerously addictive drugs, heroin and morphine’. It was for Parliament to 
determine, based on available information about the structure of the illicit drug trade, 
                                                                                                                                                              
forms; either there is mutual masturbation; or there is some form of intercrural contact; or oral-
genital contact (with or without emission) takes place. Occasionally the offence may take a more 
recondite form; techniques in heterosexual relations vary considerably, and the same is true of 
homosexual relations.’ See Home Office & Scottish Home Department, Report of the Committee 
on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (Chairman: Sir John Wolfenden; Cmnd 247) (London: 
HMSO, 1957) (Wolfenden Report) 38, [104]. 
55  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 69, [111] (emphasis omitted). 
56  See the part of this article entitled ‘Legitimacy of the statutory object’ (Pt III.B.2), below. 
57  Compare Goh Yihan, ‘Statutory Interpretation in Singapore: 15 Years on from Legislative Reform’ 
(2009) 21 Sing Acad LJ 97, 121, [24]. 
58  Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710 (PC on appeal from Singapore). 
59  Misuse of Drugs Act 1973, No 5 of 1973 (now Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed). 
60  Ong Ah Chuan (n 58) 724, [32]. 
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where to establish the ‘appropriate quantitative boundary’ between ‘a dealer on the 
wholesale scale who operates near the apex of the distributive pyramid’ who deserved 
heavier punishment and ‘dealers on a smaller scale who operate nearer the base of 
the pyramid’. 61  In the final analysis, Parliament had not acted arbitrarily in 
differentiating in the Act between those who trafficked in less than 15 grams of 
heroin and those who had trafficked in 15 grams or more, and this differentia bore ‘a 
reasonable relation to the social object of the law’. 62  Their Lordships’ 
characterization of the object of the Act was subsequently adopted in other cases.63 
In 1993, soon after the House of Lords (HL) decided Pepper (Inspector of 
Taxes) v Hart,64 the Parliament introduced section 9A into the Interpretation Act,65 
subsection (1) of which states: 
In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, an interpretation that 
would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that 
purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be 
preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpose or object. 
Although the provision is aimed at the ascertainment of the meaning of a written law 
rather than the object of a written law for the purpose of the reasonable classification 
test, in Taw Cheng Kong66 the HC proceeded to adopt the purposive approach for the 
latter purpose. This is arguably not a misuse of section 9A since the purposive 
approach towards statutory interpretation in fact requires the court to ascertain ‘the 
purpose or object underlying the written law’.67 The Court sounded a note of caution, 
saying that when a new provision has been introduced into an Act, it is not right to 
blindly assume that the object of the original Act also applies to the new provision:68 
[I]t is not a rule that Parliament must legislate consistently with past 
legislation. On the contrary, subsequent legislation must, where inconsistent 
with past legislation, prevail over it. The objective of the court is not to 
construe all legislation as if Parliament was in some way bound by its 
intentions when it first passed the Act. It is to construe why Parliament has 
seen fit to amend that Act in the light of the inadequacies that the passage of 
time has revealed or new needs carried by the tide of progress.69 
Section 9A(2) of the Interpretation Act goes on to explain that a court may consider 
extrinsic materials, that is, ‘any material not forming part of the written law… 
capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning’ of a provision of a written 
law, either ‘to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning 
conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the written 
law and the purpose or object underlying the written law’ or 
                                                   
61  ibid 725–726, [38]. 
62  ibid 725, [37]. 
63  See, for example, Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103 (CA) 122–123, 
[69]; Johari bin Kanadi v Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 422 (HC) 432, [14]. 
64  Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL). 
65  Interpretation Act, Cap 1, 1985 Rev Ed (now 2002 Rev Ed). Section 9A was introduced by the 
Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1993, No 11 of 1993. For a general discussion about the effect of 
the provision in Singapore, see Goh (n 57). 
66  Taw Cheng Kong (HC) (n 37). 
67  Interpretation Act, Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed (IA), s 9A(1). 
68  Taw Cheng Kong (HC) (n 37), 97, [40]. 
69  ibid 97, [42]. 
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to ascertain the meaning of the provision when — (i) the provision is 
ambiguous or obscure; or (ii) the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of 
the provision taking into account its context in the written law and the 
purpose or object underlying the written law leads to a result that is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
Among the extrinsic materials that may be consulted are ‘any explanatory statement 
relating to the Bill containing the provision’, ‘the speech made in Parliament by a 
Minister on the occasion of the moving by that Minister of a motion that the Bill 
containing the provision be read a second time in Parliament’, and ‘any relevant 
material in any official record of debates in Parliament’.70 
Section 9A(1) which decrees the use of a purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation, and section 9A(2) which deals with the use of extrinsic materials by 
the courts, are distinct from each other – nothing in section 9A(1) mandates 
resorting to extrinsic materials to determine the object of a written law.71 However, 
the CA has held: ‘A purposive approach to statutory interpretation would invariably 
involve reference to extrinsic materials that may assist in the interpretation of the 
statutory provision.’72 This may justify the courts consulting extrinsic materials when 
determining the statutory object in the context of the reasonable classification test, 
even though section 9A(2) only refers to the use of such materials to ascertain or 
confirm the meaning of a provision. 
In Taw Cheng Kong, the Court had to establish the object of section 37(1) of 
Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA),73 which had been introduced in 1966 into the 
original Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 1960, 74  to determine if the use of 
Singapore citizenship as a differentia in the section infringed Article 12(1). Section 
37(1) is an extraterritoriality clause that extends the effect of the Act to Singapore 
citizens who commit corrupt acts outside Singapore. The Court began by looking at 
the explanatory statement in the 1966 bill and the parliamentary debates that had 
taken place at that time. However, finding them unhelpful, it concluded that 
Parliament had intended the 1966 amendments to further the objectives of the 
original statute. Accordingly, it turned to the explanatory statement in the bill that 
had subsequently been enacted as the 1960 Ordinance, and the speech of the 
Minister for Home Affairs during the Second Reading of the bill. Noting that the 
Minister had emphasized the Government’s determination to stamp out bribery and 
corruption in Singapore, the Court concluded that the object of the PCA is to root out 
corruption affecting the Singapore Civil Service or corrupt practices among 
fiduciaries in Singapore. Thus, the object of section 37(1) was to address corrupt acts 
taking place outside Singapore which affected events within the country.75 
This led the Court to conclude that there was an insufficient nexus between 
the object and the differentia of citizenship.76 The classification was over-inclusive as 
it subjected to criminal liability citizens whose corrupt acts had no effect on 
Singapore – for example, ‘a Singapore citizen now a foreign permanent resident, 
employed in the foreign country by the foreign government, receiving a bribe paid in 
                                                   
70  IA, s 9A(3)(b)–(d). 
71  Goh (n 57) 110, [12]. 
72  The “Seaway” [2005] 1 SLR(R) 435 (CA) 445, [25]. 
73  PCA (n 31). 
74  Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 1960, No 39 of 1960. Section 37(1) was introduced into the 
1960 Ordinance as s 31A by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 1966, No 10 of 1966. 
75  Taw Cheng Kong (HC) (n 37), 99–101, [46]–[51]. 
76  ibid 104, [65]. 
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the foreign country in a foreign currency by a foreign payor’. Simultaneously, it was 
under-inclusive because permanent residents and foreigners whose corrupt acts 
committed abroad did in fact have an impact on Singapore were excluded – for 
example, ‘a Singapore permanent resident or a foreigner working for the Singapore 
government who agrees to take a short trip outside Singapore to receive a bribe in 
Singapore dollars in relation to an act he will then do in Singapore’.77 
When the matter came before the CA by way of a criminal reference,78 it took a 
much less comprehensive approach and reached a different result. First, it examined 
the long title of the 1960 Ordinance, noted it merely stated ‘An Act to provide for the 
more effectual prevention of corruption’, and commented that it was obvious the 
extraterritoriality clause was introduced ‘to widen the ambit of the Act for the more 
effective control and suppression of corruption’.79 Next, it examined section 37(1) 
itself, and concluded that the wide language used meant that the provision ‘is capable 
of capturing all corrupt acts by Singapore citizens outside Singapore, irrespective of 
whether such corrupt acts have consequences within the borders of Singapore or 
not’.80 In other words, the Court did not see why the object of the provision should be 
limited to corrupt acts occurring outside Singapore which have an effect in the 
country. The Court found it could ascertain the object of the provision from an 
examination of the PCA alone, without having to resort to extrinsic materials. 
Eventually it held that, given the potential breadth of section 37(1), it was rational for 
Parliament to have drafted it ‘to draw the line at citizenship and leave out non-
citizens so as to observe international comity and the sovereignty of other nations’.81 
In addition, the CA found the HC had been wrong to postulate that the provision was 
arbitrary because it was under- and over-inclusive. This was because the respondent, 
Taw, had not adduced sufficient ‘material or factual evidence to show that it was 
enacted arbitrarily or had operated arbitrarily’, and thus the presumption of 
constitutionality had not been displaced.82 
Tan Yock Lin prefers the CA’s view, being of the opinion that the HC’s 
conclusion that section 37(1) was aimed at ensuring corrupt acts committed abroad 
which have an effect in Singapore was ‘presupposed rather than proved’.83 He also 
wonders why the HC gave effect to the effects notion of extraterritoriality rather than 
other possible forms.84 I am not sure I agree with him, because the HC based its 
conclusion on a parliamentary speech and did not merely pluck it out of the air. The 
answer may lie in a careful reading of Hansard to determine what exactly was the 
Parliament’s intent when enacting the PCA. 
                                                   
77  ibid 104, [64]. 
78  The defendant, Taw Cheng Kong, had been found guilty of corruption by a District Court, but the 
conviction was overturned on appeal to the HC inter alia on the ground that s 37(1) of the PCA 
violated Art 12(1) of the Constitution. As the HC is the final appellate court for criminal matters 
originating from the District Court, to obtain a ruling on the constitutionality of s 37(1), the Public 
Prosecutor brought the matter before the CA by way of a criminal reference. The CA’s judgment 
was purely on points of law and had no effect on the defendant’s acquittal: ‘Two Key Issues 
Referred to Court of Appeal’, The Straits Times (Singapore, 27 May 1998) 41. 
79  Taw Cheng Kong (CA) (n 13), 509, [63]. 
80  ibid 509–510, [64]. 
81  ibid 512, [75]. 
82  ibid 512, [77], and 514, [80]. 
83  Tan (n 32) 16. 
84  ibid; other notions of extraterritorial crimes include the result notion (the crime is committed 
wherever its result or any part of its result occurs), the continuing notion (the crime is committed 
wherever a part of the continuation of the crime occurs), and even the notion that a crime may be 
punished within a jurisdiction when a significant portion of the crime is committed there, though 
Tan notes there are ‘obvious disadvantages’ to the latter notion: ibid 29–30. 
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Turning now to the HC decision in Lim Meng Suang, it is evident that the 
Court adopted the approach taken by the HC in Taw Cheng Kong, though the judge 
rightly did not rule out the possibility of the object being inferable from the provision 
itself. He said: 
In ascertaining the purpose or object of a statutory provision, if such purpose 
or object is not already clear from the provision itself…, then in accordance 
with s 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed)…, we may look to 
any explanatory statement in the Bill introducing the provision or to the 
speech made in Parliament at the second reading of that Bill. These must be 
the primary guideposts. The purpose of an earlier precursor of the statutory 
provision, especially if that precursor is a statute or subsidiary legislation 
from another jurisdiction, is but a secondary guidepost at best, referable for 
context or for elucidation when the primary guideposts are silent or unclear. 
Such secondary guideposts must be used with extreme caution.85 
Accordingly, he preferred the reasons given by the Attorney-General during a debate 
of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council on 13 June 1938 for the introduction of 
section 377A over the reasons for the introduction of the provision’s British precursor, 
section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885.86 The Attorney-General had 
stated: 
With regard to clause 4 it is unfortunately the case that acts of the nature 
described have been brought to notice. As the law now stands, such acts can 
only be dealt with, if at all, under the Minor Offences Ordinance, and then 
only if committed in public. Punishment under the Ordinance is inadequate 
and the chances of detection are small. It is desired, therefore, to strengthen 
the law and to bring it into line with the English Criminal Law, from which 
this clause is taken, and the law of various other parts of the Colonial Empire 
of which it is only necessary to mention Hong Kong and Gibraltar where 
conditions are somewhat similar to our own.87 
The CA followed suit, noting it could not be assumed that the object of section 377A 
was the same as the object of section 11 of the UK Act introduced more than half a 
century earlier.88 I submit this was correct as ultimately the relevant opinions are 
those of the local legislature, not those of any foreign legislative body. 
Furthermore, the CA also followed the approach of the HC in Taw Cheng 
Kong, embarking on a detailed examination of extrinsic materials to ascertain the 
object of section 377A. In addition to the Attorney-General’s speech, these included 
the objects and reasons accompanying the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 1938, prior 
legislation such as section 23 of the Minor Offences Ordinance 190689 and section 
377 of the Penal Code90 which were both referred to in the foregoing materials, 
Colonial Office correspondence on the enactment of section 377A, and annual reports 
on the organization and administration of the Straits Settlements Police and the state 
                                                   
85  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 149, [70]. 
86  UK Criminal Amendment Act 1885 (n 53). 
87  C G Howell (Attorney-General), speech during the Second Reading of the Penal Code 
(Amendment) Bill, Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements (13 June 
1938), B49, cited in Lim Meng Suang (n 1) 148, [66]. The bill was enacted as the Penal Code 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1938, No 12 of 1938, on the same day. 
88  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 71, [118]. 
89  Minor Offences Ordinance 1906, No 13 of 1906 (Straits Settlements). 
90  Penal Code, Cap 20, 1936 Rev Ed (Straits Settlements). 
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of crime in the Settlements.91 These materials shed light on the mischief that section 
377A was enacted to address. They led the Court to conclude that the provision was 
intended to have general application and to enforce societal views about the morality 
of sexual acts between men. It rejected the appellants’ assertion that the section was 
only intended to combat male prostitution, which implied that use of the provision to 
target consensual behaviour was over-inclusive and unconstitutional.92 
When ascertaining the object of section 377A, the CA made no mention of the 
parliamentary debate about the provision that look place on 22 October 2007 when 
the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 2007,93 which sought to comprehensively revise 
the Penal Code, was given its Second Reading. Prior to this, news that the 
Government had decided not to repeal section 377A as part of its review of the Code 
had engendered heated debate in the media, and led to a petition signed by 2,341 
citizens calling for section 377A to be repealed being presented to Parliament for its 
consideration. 94  The petition was debated during the Second Reading of the 
amendment bill. We may surmise that the CA agreed with the HC that the debates 
were irrelevant. The judge had stated: 
… if the purpose of a provision was articulated in Parliament when it was first 
introduced, and at some later date, a comprehensive review of the Act 
containing that provision was carried out and it was decided that the 
provision should be retained, then absent any unusual facts or circumstances, 
the purpose of the provision as articulated in Parliament when the provision 
was first introduced will still be the purpose for which that provision was 
enacted.95 
In his view, no ‘unusual facts or circumstances’ had been demonstrated, so the 
purpose of section 377A remained that articulated by the Attorney-General of the 
Straits Settlements in 1938, as the speeches made by Members of Parliament 
supporting the retention of the provision had essentially affirmed ‘that Singapore 
was a conservative society where the majority did not accept homosexuality’.96 
Po Jen Yap has commented that the HC took an unduly restrictive approach 
by inquiring into the original purpose of section 377A when it was introduced in 1938, 
instead of considering fresh purposes supporting the section which were put forward 
by the state during the hearing.97 Indeed, the Attorney-General and the plaintiffs’ 
counsel agreed that if the original purpose of section 377A is no longer applicable or 
acceptable today,98 but there exists a new purpose which the section might serve such 
as preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS, this new purpose could be substituted for the 
old one. The HC felt the issue was ‘intriguing’ but did not arise on the facts of the 
case and so made no decision on it. 99  The CA said it was ‘by no means an 
                                                   
91  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 71–75, [119]–[127]. 
92  ibid 75–81, [128]–[149]. 
93  Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 2007, Bill No 38 of 2007. 
94  The petition is summarized in Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1) 152–153, [76]. 
95  ibid 153, [77]. 
96  ibid 156, [85]. 
97  Yap Po Jen, Case Comment, ‘Section 377A and Equal Protection in Singapore: Back to 1938?’ 
(2013) 25 Sing Acad LJ 630, 632–636, [6]–[20]. 
98  For example, if there exists scientific evidence that sexual orientation is determined entirely by 
genetic factors and not by parental or societal nurturing or lifestyle choices, and is immutable: 
Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 156–157, [87]. In Tan Eng Hong (merits) (n 2), 1081–1083, [57]–
[64], the Court said that since medical and scientific evidence on the issue is inconclusive, on a 
balance of probabilities it could not hold that homosexuality is a natural and immutable attribute. 
99  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1) 156–157, [87]. 
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inappropriate argument’, but that it raised ‘extra-legal’ issues which should be 
addressed by the legislature rather than the court.100 
With respect, it is submitted that the courts acted correctly in looking 
primarily to the object of section 377A articulated in 1938. In R v Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd,101 Chief Justice Brian Dickson, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, held that legislative purpose ‘is a function of the intent of those who drafted 
and enacted the legislation at the time, and not of any shifting variable’.102 Hence, the 
Court took the view that it was the purpose of the Lord’s Day Act,103 which made it an 
offence to sell goods on a Sunday, when it was adopted in 1906 which had to be 
judged. It was clear that the Act had been enacted to enforce observance of the 
Christian Sabbath, and since it was impermissible to attribute to the Act the fresh 
secular purpose of providing workers with a day of rest, the Act infringed the 
fundamental freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed by section 2(a) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and was not a reasonable limit on the 
freedom demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. 
Moreover, as I have written elsewhere: 
If the court were to accept fresh explanations of a provision’s purposes from 
the executive branch, this would provide a novel and unorthodox avenue for 
the interpretation of the provision to be manipulated without the matter being 
debated by the legislature. It is contended that the latter is the appropriate 
method for the legislature to imbue an existing provision with a new purpose. 
If Parliament has had occasion to reconsider a provision and there is cogent 
evidence that it has decided to retain it unchanged for fresh purposes, this 
ought to be taken into account by the court. However, absent such a 
scenario, … [there] is no warrant for a court to ignore the original legislative 
purpose and construct a largely fictitious one.104 
Thus, if in 2007 the Singapore Parliament had expressly decided to retain section 
377A in the statute book for a new objective, such as to reduce the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS, this would have to be taken into account when applying the reasonable 
classification test. According to the HC in Lim Meng Suang, though, there was no 
evidence of this. 
The judgments discussed above highlight the following. First, a court may 
ascertain the object of a provision by examining its wording and its context (such as 
other provisions of the Act in which it is found, and the long title of the Act), as well 
as extrinsic materials such as the explanatory statement in the bill which preceded 
the Act, and parliamentary speeches that were made during the enactment of the bill. 
As regards the latter, the court must necessarily be wary about relying on statements 
taken out of context. Secondly, and perhaps more crucially, different results will be 
reached depending on how narrowly or widely the object is expressed.105 The point 
will become evident when we examine the rational relation requirement of limb (b) 
in the next section of this article. At the moment, we have little guidance from the 
courts on how the task of properly characterizing a statutory object should be 
fulfilled. The CA’s judgment in Lim Meng Suang suggests the court must strive to be 
objective and avoid imputing intentions to the legislature that cannot fairly be 
                                                   
100  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 89, [177] (emphasis omitted). 
101  R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295 (SC, Canada). 
102  ibid 335, [91]. 
103  Lord’s Day Act, RSC 1970, c L-13 (Canada). 
104  Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, ‘The Text through Time’ (2010) 31(3) Stat L Rev 217, 228. 
105  Tan (n 32) 15. 
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discerned from the statutory text and relevant extrinsic materials. Nonetheless, it 
appears the courts wield much discretion in this respect. 
B. WHETHER A RATIONAL RELATION EXISTS 
1. Standard of Review 
This brings us to our next issue – whether there can be said to be a rational nexus or 
relation between the differentia underlying the classification and the object of the 
impugned provision. In Lim Meng Suang the HC defined something that is rational 
as being ‘based on, endowed with or governed by reason. It must be, at the minimum, 
reasonable in the sense that it is capable of being supported or justified by reason 
and is in conformity with what is fairly to be expected or called for.’106 This is 
uncontroversial, but then the Court cited the following passage from the Indian case 
Chiranjit Lal v Union of India: 
… The legislature undoubtedly has a wide field of choice in determining and 
classifying the subject of its laws, and if the law deals alike with all of a certain 
class, it is normally not obnoxious to the charge of denial of equal protection; 
but the classification should never be arbitrary. It must always rest upon 
some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation 
to the things in respect to which the classification is made; and classification 
made without any substantial basis should be regarded as invalid. 107 
[Emphasis added by the HC.] 
The reference to arbitrariness echoes Eng Foong Ho v Attorney-General, 108  an 
earlier CA decision involving the allegedly discriminatory application of a statute 
neutral on its face, rather than a statute containing a discriminatory classification. In 
view of this difference, the Court recast the reasonable classification test by stating 
that ‘[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable nexus between the state action 
and the objective to be achieved by the law’.109 Arguably, the Court need not have 
done so, as it could have considered whether the state action had discriminated 
against one class of persons as compared to one or more similarly situated classes, 
and then carried out the familiar process of assessing if the differentia underlying the 
impugned classification bore a rational relation to the object of the state action.110 In 
any case, the Court said: ‘An executive act may be unconstitutional if it amounts to 
intentional and arbitrary discrimination’,111 and noted that ‘[a]rbitrariness implies 
the lack of any rationality’.112 The existence of inequalities due to ‘inadvertence or 
                                                   
106  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 157, [89]. 
107  Charanjit (n 20), [1950] SCR at 911–912 (citation omitted). 
108  Eng Foong Ho v Attorney-General [2009] 2 SLR(R) 542 (CA). 
109  ibid 550, [25]. 
110  For example, in Mohamed Emran bin Mohamed Ali v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 411, 
420–424, [22]–[33], the HC held that it was not discriminatory for the Public Prosecutor to have 
prosecuted the appellant for drug trafficking but to have taken no action against the state agent 
provocateur responsible for entrapping the appellant into selling drugs to him, because there was 
‘a perfectly rational nexus between entrapment operations and the socially desirable and laudable 
objective of containing the drug trade’: 422, [30]. 
111  Eng Foong Ho (n 108) 553, [30] (emphasis added), citing Public Prosecutor v Ang Soon Huat 
[1990] 2 SLR(R) 246 (HC) 258, [23], which in turn cited Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor 
[1990] 1 SLR(R) 78 (PC on appeal from Singapore) 84, [17]. 
112  Eng Foong Ho, ibid (emphasis added), citing Ang Soon Huat, ibid. 
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inefficiency’ might also infringe Article 12(1), but not unless they are ‘on a very 
substantial scale’.113 
This standard of review is highly deferential to the political branches of the 
government, because it is easily achieved – the state need only show that the 
relationship between the classification and the object is neither arbitrary nor 
irrational. The standard is particularly significant because in Lim Meng Suang the 
HC applied it to different facets of the reasonable classification test – not only when 
determining if a rational relation existed between the classification and the statutory 
object, but also when ascertaining the legitimacy of the object and applying a 
presumption of constitutionality, which will be examined below. 
The rationality of the relationship is a function of the ‘fit’ between the 
classification and the object. The HC held that what Article 12(1) requires is a ‘broad 
fit’114 or, in the words of the CA’s judgment in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor 
(2010),115 the differentia underlying the classification must be ‘broadly proportionate’ 
to the purpose of the law. 116  The test does not require a complete coincidence 
between the classification and the object117 or, to put it another way, it is unnecessary 
for the classification to be the most efficient means of achieving the statutory 
objective. Indeed, 
what is the most effective differentia to use as the basis of a classification 
prescribed by law… is a matter which “lies within the province of the 
Legislature, not the Judiciary”…118 The court’s role and function is not to 
second-guess whether Parliament could have or ought to have devised a more 
efficacious differentia. Instead, the court can intervene only if the differentia 
enacted by Parliament is so clearly inefficacious that it would not even be 
capable of being considered broadly proportionate to the object of the 
legislation in question.119 
As a result, the current reasonable classification test tolerates a fair degree of under- 
and over-inclusiveness, a point illustrated by the CA’s decision in Taw Cheng 
Kong.120 The CA found that the under-inclusiveness of section 37(1) of the PCA was 
not fatal. It was enough that the classification furthered the object of the Act, and it 
did not have to be ‘seamless and perfect to cover every contingency. Such a demand 
would be legislatively impractical, if not impossible.’121 As regards over-inclusiveness, 
the HC in Lim Meng Suang noted there were cases from India and the US which had 
upheld such classifications in emergency situations or to give effect to an affirmative 
action policy.122 
Ultimately, though, the HC held that the differentia underlying the 
classification in section 377A was neither under- nor over-inclusive. Rather, in this 
case there was a ‘complete coincidence’ between the classification and the statutory 
                                                   
113  Eng Foong Ho, ibid 551, [28], citing Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 594 
(PC on appeal from Singapore) 600, [13]. 
114  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 160, [96]. 
115  Yong Vui Kong (2010) (n 23) 537, [112]. 
116  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 158–159, [94]. 
117  ibid 160–161, [98], citing Huang-Thio (n 26) 431. 
118  Yong Vui Kong (2010) (n 23) 538, [113]. 
119  ibid 159–160, [95] (original emphasis). 
120  Taw Cheng Kong (CA) (n 13). See the text accompanying nn 73–82 above. 
121  Taw Cheng Kong (CA) (n 13), 514, [81]. 
122  Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 1), 161, [99]. 
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object.123 The CA did not discuss the rational relation requirement in much detail, 
but agreed with the HC that a perfect relation need not be present, and stated that 
the requirement would only fail to be satisfied if there is ‘a clear disconnect between 
the purpose and object of the impugned statute on the one hand and the relevant 
differentia on the other’.124 It accepted the HC’s view that a complete coincidence 
existed between the differentia and the object of section 377A. This conclusion was 
not surprising, given the CA’s fairly narrow characterization of section 377A’s object 
based on its reading of the 1938 Legislative Council debates. 
2. Legitimacy of the Statutory Object 
In Lim Meng Suang the CA admitted that ‘[a]lthough the absence of… a rational 
relation can take many forms, … the requisite rational relation will – more often than 
not – be found’. 125  This is particularly so if the court defines the object of the 
impugned statutory provision narrowly. For example, let us say that the government 
has developed an animus towards red-haired people, and therefore enacts a statute 
expelling people with hair of that colour from the country. The differentia underlying 
the classification (people with red hair) clearly bears a rational relation to a closely 
drawn object (the expulsion of red-haired people). The statute is arguably 
problematic because its object is irrational and unjust, and thus illegitimate. Yet it is 
entirely conceivable for an illegitimate object to satisfy the rational relation 
component of the reasonable classification test.126 
If the legislature’s object for enacting section 377A in 1938 was ‘to respond to 
a prevalence of grossly indecent acts between males – whether in public or in private 
– which the Legislature deemed a regrettable state of affairs that was not 
desirable’,127 can the court declare that this object is illegitimate? Earlier cases on 
Article 12(1) of the Constitution were silent on the issue, but the HC in Lim Meng 
Suang said it was necessary for the court to assess whether the object of the 
impugned provision is legitimate, or whether it is itself discriminatory.128 However, 
the CA disagreed, holding: 
To permit the court the power… to declare a statute inconsistent with Art 
12(1)… because the object of that statute is illegitimate would precisely be to 
confer on the court a licence to usurp the legislative function in the course of 
becoming (or at least acting like) a “mini-legislature”. Put another way, only 
the legislature has the power to review its own legislation and amend 
legislation accordingly if it is of the view that this is necessary. The courts, in 
contrast, have no such power – nor ought they to have such power.129 
Moreover, according to the CA, Article 12(1) provides no legal standards that assist 
the courts to determine if a statutory object is illegitimate. Any such standards would 
be ‘extra-legal’.130 The Court identified some of these standards as the ‘tyranny of the 
                                                   
123  ibid 161–162, [100]. 
124  Lim Meng Suang (CA) (n 3), 51, [68] (original emphasis). 
125  ibid. 
126  The point has been made by various scholars: see, for example, Tussman & tenBroek (n 26) 356–
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127  Tan Eng Hong (merits) (n 2), 1090, [86(b)]. 
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majority’, the absence of harm, the immutability and/or intractable difficulty of 
changing one’s sexual orientation, and the safeguarding of public health; it concluded 
that these were relevant for Parliament to take into account if amending the law, but 
irrelevant to the courts’ task of applying Article 12(1).131 In the Court’s view, the only 
legal standards it could consider were set out in Article 12(2) of the Constitution: 
Except as expressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall be no 
discrimination against citizens of Singapore on the ground only of religion, 
race, descent or place of birth in any law or in the appointment to any office 
or employment under a public authority or in the administration of any law 
relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the 
establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or 
employment. [Emphasis added.] 
Since this provision did not prohibit discrimination on the ground of sex, sexual 
orientation or gender, it did not invalidate section 377A.132 
It is respectfully submitted that the CA’s pronouncements set out above 
appear inconsistent with the role of the courts delineated by Articles 4 and 162 of the 
Constitution. Article 162 states: 
Subject to this Article, all existing laws shall continue in force on and after the 
commencement of this Constitution and all laws which have not been brought 
into force by the date of the commencement of this Constitution may, subject 
as aforesaid, be brought into force on or after its commencement, but all such 
laws shall, subject to this Article, be construed as from the commencement of 
this Constitution with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and 
exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with this 
Constitution. [Emphasis added.] 
The provision explicitly envisages that pre-independence laws must be made to 
conform with the Constitution through ‘modifications, adaptations, qualifications 
and exceptions’, and when considering if the plaintiff Tan Eng Hong had standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of section 377A, the CA asserted that this power is 
exercised by the courts.133 In Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,134 the HL went so far as to 
regard clauses along the lines of Article 162 in the constitutions of former colonial 
territories as giving the court: 
… a quasi-legislative power, not a purely interpretative one; for the court is 
not constrained by the language of the statute in question, which it may 
modify (ie amend) in order to bring it into conformity with the constitution. … 
Such a power is appropriate where the constitution (particularly one based on 
the separation of powers) is the supreme law, and where statutes inconsistent 
with the constitution are to the extent of the inconsistency automatically 
rendered void by the constitution. A finding of inconsistency may leave a 
lacuna in the statute book which in many cases must be filled without delay if 
chaos is to be avoided and which can be filled only by the exercise of a 
legislative power.135 
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Article 4 states that the Constitution ‘is the supreme law of the Republic of 
Singapore and any law enacted by the Legislature after the commencement of this 
Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void’. In Tan Eng Hong, the CA held that despite the express 
wording of Article 4, on a purposive reading of this provision with Article 162 the 
courts possess power under Article 4 to invalidate legislation pre-dating the 
Constitution which is inconsistent with it.136 These constitutional provisions and the 
CA’s own interpretation of them are hard to square with the Court’s averment in Lim 
Meng Suang that ‘the duty of a court is to interpret statutes enacted by the 
legislature’, and that ‘it cannot amend or modify statutes based on its own personal 
preference or fiat as that would be an obvious (and unacceptable) usurpation of the 
legislative function’.137 
In fact, in Yong Vui Kong (2010) the Court had made the obiter suggestion 
that ‘legislation of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could not possibly have been 
contemplated by our constitutional framers as being “law” when they crafted the 
constitutional provisions protecting fundamental liberties’ would not qualify as a 
‘law’ justifying the deprivation of life or personal liberty under Article 9(1) of the 
Constitution.138 In Lim Meng Suang it was argued that section 377A was both absurd 
and arbitrary,139 and while the CA rejected these submissions it cast no doubt on the 
Yong Vui Kong principle.140 If a court can find that legislation is inconsistent with 
Article 9(1) because it is absurd or arbitrary, it should also be able to hold that 
legislation is inconsistent with Article 12(1) because its object is illegitimate. The two 
tasks are essentially the same. 
The necessity for the court to assess the legitimacy of statutory objectives is 
illustrated by the example of a hypothetical law banning women from driving raised 
by the appellants and commented on by the CA. The Court said it was at least 
arguable that the law would fail the reasonable classification test. There might not be 
a rational relation between the differentia used in the law and the object of the law 
under limb (b). This might be so if the object was, say, to improve road safety 
standards. However, the Court acknowledged that the rational relation requirement 
would be satisfied if ‘the purpose and object of that law is precisely to ban all women 
from driving’. It then argued that the differentia used in the law might be illogical 
and/or incoherent under limb (a).141 As was noted earlier,142 ascertaining whether an 
applicant fell within the class of persons burdened by the law would fairly 
straightforward, so the differentia can only unintelligible because it is manifestly 
discriminatory. If a court has a duty under limb (a) to determine if the differentia in a 
law is logically intelligible, it is hard to see why it is wrong for it to consider the 
legitimacy of the statutory object. The task need only be carried out once, so whether 
it is done under limb (a) or (b) is immaterial, though it may be clearer to confine limb 
(a) to an assessment of whether who comes within the class defined by the law is 
unequivocally ascertainable. The point is that an attempt by Parliament to expressly 
discriminate against a class of persons can only be opposed by the court if it accepts 
it has a responsibility to examine the legitimacy of the statutory object. 
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3. Proportionality 
Assuming the court does recognize this responsibility, it will have to set out a test for 
determining when a statutory objective should be regarded as illegitimate. In this 
respect, the HC in Lim Meng Suang set the standard of review very high by requiring 
the legislative objective to discriminate ‘arbitrarily’.143 It commented that ‘[w]here a 
piece of legislation does not satisfy the requirement of legitimacy of purpose, the 
terms “capricious”, “absurd” and “Wednesbury unreasonableness” come to mind’, 
and that ‘a fundamental question in most cases is “the proper weight that ought to be 
ascribed to the views of Parliament as encapsulated in the impugned legislation”’.144 
However, the CA itself recognized that the Wednesbury standard ‘is not… an 
appropriate legal standard in the context of a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute’.145 
It is submitted that in place of limb (b) of the current reasonable classification 
test the court should move towards adopting a proportionality analysis, which has 
been applied in Hong Kong (HL). Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung146 provides a 
good illustration of this approach. Although homosexual acts in the form of buggery 
occurring in private had been decriminalized in HK in 1991, it remained a crime 
under section 118 F(1) of the Crimes Ordinance147 for a man to commit buggery with 
another man otherwise than in private. The respondents had been charged with the 
offence for engaging in homosexual buggery in a car parked at the side of a public 
road. They argued, among other things, that because no comparable offence was 
committed by a man and a woman who engaged in vaginal intercourse or buggery 
otherwise than in private, this provision violated their right to equality guaranteed by 
Article 25 of the Basic Law of the HK Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China and Article 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.148 The 
former provision states that ‘[a]ll Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law’, 
while the latter reads: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any distinction to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status. 
Article 25 of the Basic Law and the first sentence of Article 22 of the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance are in pari materia with Article 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution. The 
second sentence of Article 22 provides an open-ended list of grounds on which 
discrimination is prohibited and thus merely illuminates the first sentence. I submit 
the fact that it has no equivalent in the Singapore Constitution does not rule out the 
application of a proportionality analysis to the latter. 
In Yau Yuk Lung the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) set out its mode of analysis, 
which it termed the ‘justification test’ as follows:149 
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In order for differential treatment to be justified, it must be shown that:  
(1) The difference in treatment must pursue a legitimate aim. For any 
aim to be legitimate, a genuine need for such difference must be 
established. 
(2) The difference in treatment must be rationally connected to the 
legitimate aim. 
(3) The difference in treatment must be no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the legitimate aim. 
The HK Government argued that by enacting section 118 F(1), the legislature 
must be regarded as having felt a genuine need for such an offence as part of its 
reform of the law relating to homosexual conduct. The Court held that it could not be 
assumed from the mere fact of the provision’s enactment that there was a genuine 
need for the differential treatment. Since the Government had not otherwise 
demonstrated such a genuine need, step 1 of the justification test had not been 
satisfied. 150  Thus, the section was unconstitutional and the charges against the 
respondents should be dismissed. 
Stage 2 of the test is broadly similar to the reasonable classification test 
applicable in Singapore, but the latter lacks stages 1 and 3. Stage 1 requires an 
assessment of the legitimacy of the statutory object, and by adopting it the court 
would avoid the curious result that the Parliament can enact a blatantly 
discriminatory law that nonetheless satisfies the reasonable classification test. Stage 
3 establishes a rigorous standard that laws and executive actions must achieve, which 
emphasizes the importance of the fundamental right of equality and ensures that 
Article 12(1) is not mere rhetoric. Regrettably, the HC has, in the past, declined to 
apply a proportionality analysis to the rights to freedom of speech and assembly 
guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution; 151  the point is certainly ripe for 
reassessment.152 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
In Lim Meng Suang, the CA reaffirmed that in constitutional claims ‘there is a 
presumption of constitutionality inasmuch as a court will not lightly find a statute or 
any provision(s) thereof… unconstitutional… . This is logical as well as 
commonsensical as our legislature is presumed not to enact legislation which is 
inconsistent with the Singapore Constitution.’ 153  The Court cited its own prior 
decision, Taw Cheng Kong, where it had said that a ‘strong presumption of 
constitutional validity’ applies when the constitutionality of a statutory provision is 
challenged under Article 12(1).154 
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This principle has been applied in other constitutional cases,155 though it was 
not explained in them how a ‘strong’ presumption is different from an ordinary one, 
or why a strong instead of an ordinary presumption applies. While the Court did not 
expressly mention the adjective strong when speaking of the presumption in Lim 
Meng Suang, it did posit that the presumption does not operate as strongly to pre-
independence laws (that is, laws enacted before 9 August 1965) as it does to post-
independence laws.156 This is because pre-independence laws were enacted in the 
absence of any constitution,157 whereas post-independence laws ‘would necessarily 
have been promulgated in the context of, inter alia, an elected legislature which, it 
can be assumed, would have fully considered all views’ before enacting the laws. In 
any case, when applying the presumption the court would ‘always have regard to all 
the circumstances of the case (including both the relevant text as well as the context 
of the statute concerned)’. 158  This reasoning would justify referring to the 
presumption applying to post-independence laws as ‘strong’. 
Oddly, the Court did not clearly indicate how the presumption of 
constitutionality applied to the facts of the case. One would imagine that it is an 
overarching principle that applies to both stages of the reasonable classification test. 
However, in practice it has only been invoked during the rational relation stage. At 
the HC level in Lim Meng Suang, in an attempt to demonstrate there was no rational 
relation between the classification employed in section 377A and the provision’s 
object, the plaintiffs argued that the existence of the provision did not indicate that 
male homosexual behaviour is undesirable since the Government had announced a 
policy of not proactively enforcing the provision when private consensual conduct 
was involved. This policy was reiterated in the 2007 parliamentary debates. The HC 
found the submission unmeritorious because of the presumption of constitutionality 
– because the plaintiffs had not adduced ‘compelling or cogent material or factual 
evidence’ that section 377A could signal disapprobation of male homosexual conduct 
merely by remaining on the statute book, the presumption had not been displaced 
and the Court had to assume that the provision was constitutional.159 
The reference to ‘material or factual evidence’ was from Taw Cheng Kong, in 
which the CA explained the workings of the presumption in these terms: 
[U]nless the law is plainly arbitrary on its face, postulating examples of 
arbitrariness would ordinarily not be helpful in rebutting the presumption of 
constitutionality. This is because another court or person can well postulate 
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an equal number if not more examples to show that the law did not operate 
arbitrarily. If postulating examples of arbitrariness can always by themselves 
be sufficient for purposes of rebuttal, then it will hardly be giving effect to the 
presumption that Parliament knows best for its people, that its laws are 
directed at problems made manifest by experience, and hence its 
differentiation is based on adequate grounds. Therefore, to discharge the 
burden of rebutting the presumption, it will usually be necessary for the 
person challenging the law to adduce some material or factual evidence to 
show that it was enacted arbitrarily or had operated arbitrarily. Otherwise, 
there will be no practical difference between the presumption and the 
ordinary burden of proof on the person asserting unconstitutionality. 160 
[Emphasis added.] 
However, ‘if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances 
brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be 
regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the 
extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons 
for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating 
legislation’.161 
Once again, the standard of review applied to the presumption of 
constitutionality was arbitrariness, casting a heavy onus on the applicant. When 
determining if a law is inconsistent with Article 12(1), and ‘if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts 
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed’ by the court. 162  Yet, the 
Government is not called on to discharge its evidential burden of proving the 
constitutionality of law unless the applicant is able to adduce compelling or cogent 
material or factual evidence demonstrating that the law was enacted arbitrarily or 
operated arbitrarily. 163  Clearly, such evidence is difficult to procure. One can 
practically rule out obtaining any direct evidence of arbitrary enactment since it is 
unlikely legislators will openly admit that they intend to enact a discriminatory law. 
As for arbitrary operation of a law, will the court accept anything less than a 
statistically significant survey which will be costly to arrange? Moreover, it is unclear 
what is needed to overcome the presumption if an applicant claims that the 
classification used in a law is intrinsically discriminatory. For example, assuming for 
the sake of argument that the legislative object of section 377A is to preserve the 
traditional heterosexual family, it is not easy to see what sort of evidence an applicant 
should compile to show that the classification employed in the section lacks a 
rational relation to this object. 
In view of how deferential to the Government the reasonable classification test 
already is, it seems quite unnecessary for the courts to erect the presumption of 
constitutionality as yet another stumbling block in an applicant’s way. Indeed, if 
there is to be a presumption at all, one might argue it has already been given effect 
through how the reasonable classification test is structured, and there is no need to 
require an applicant to produce compelling or cogent material or factual evidence on 
top of that. 
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However, given how the presumption imposes an uncertain and unfair burden 
on applicants in constitutional cases, I would argue that it should be abandoned as 
part of the adoption of a proportionality analysis in constitutional adjudication, 
which was discussed above. In Yau Yuk Lung the CFA held: 
The burden is on the Government to satisfy the court that the justification test 
is satisfied. Where one is concerned with differential treatment based on 
grounds such as race, sex or sexual orientation, the court will scrutinize with 
intensity whether the difference in treatment is justified.164 [Emphasis added.] 
It was on this ground that the HKCA had, in an earlier case, rejected the argument 
that the courts should apply a concept akin to the presumption of constitutionality – 
the margin of appreciation – in favour of the legislature whenever the 
constitutionality of legislation was challenged.165 
It seems evident that the difference in the outcomes of the Yau Yuk Lung and 
Lim Meng Suang cases is due largely to the application of a presumption of 
constitutionality in the Singapore judgment. Whereas in Yau Yuk Lung section 
118 F(1) was found to violate the respondents’ rights to equality because the HK 
Government failed to discharge its burden of proving that there had been a genuine 
need for the section to treat homosexual men differently from heterosexual persons, 
in Lim Meng Suang the appellants failed to establish that section 377A was 
unconstitutional because the burden lay on them to do so. 
If the Singapore courts cannot be convinced to do away with the presumption 
of constitutionality, it is submitted that the presumption should at most be regarded 
as a restatement of the general evidential rule that it is for the applicant to raise a 
prima facie case of unconstitutionality, whereupon the Government must discharge 
its own evidential burden of showing that the law in question is constitutional.166 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Lim Meng Suang and Tan Eng Hong judgments are significant simply for being 
the first constitutional challenges against section 377A of the Penal Code, but they 
also provided an opportunity for the courts to explain how they will determine if 
executive action or legislation infringes the rights to equality before the law and 
equal protection of the law guaranteed by Article 12(1) of the Constitution. The courts 
revealed their great reluctance to involve themselves in what they saw as a morally 
controversial issue. Thus, the CA affirmed the application of the reasonable 
classification test, and characterized it as merely an ‘important threshold test’167 that 
balances ‘the need to accord as much legislative leeway as possible to the legislature 
against the need to ensure that laws which are patently illogical and/or incoherent do 
not pass legal muster’.168 The Court adopted this highly deferential stance towards 
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the Government to ‘[prevent] the courts from becoming “mini-legislatures”’,169 seeing 
Article 12(1) as ‘more of a declaratory (as well as aspirational) statement of 
principles, as opposed to a set of specific legal criteria as such’.170 
One wonders whether it was necessary for the courts to take such an approach 
that will henceforth severely limit their ability to enforce Article 12(1). They have 
applied a presumption of constitutionality, and generally adopted an arbitrariness 
standard of review when assessing whether a rational relation exists between the 
differentia underlying the classification used in the impugned provision and the 
object of the provision. Despite accepting that a classification’s differentia would be 
unintelligible if manifestly discriminatory, the Court of Appeal claimed it should not 
assess the legitimacy of the statutory object. These features have stacked the deck 
against applicants, making it very hard to see when equality challenges will succeed. 
The Court was keen to try and draw a line between legal issues which it felt 
capable of dealing with, and ‘political’ ones which should be left to Parliament. 
Perhaps the time has come to recognize that since rights adjudication is inherently 
political in that it inevitably impinges on policy matters, bright lines do not exist. 
Moreover, there is no warrant for holding that important legal changes can only be 
effected through legislation rather than court judgments. We need only consider 
landmark cases like Brown v Board of Education171 which overturned the ‘separate 
but equal’ doctrine, and Loving v Virginia172 which held laws banning interracial 
marriage to be discriminatory and unconstitutional. 
It is therefore submitted that, when the opportunity arises, the CA should 
consider recasting the reasonable classification test. The requirement in limb (a) of 
the test for a legislative classification to be defined by an intelligible differentia 
should be limited to an examination of whether it is possible to unambiguously 
ascertain who the class encompasses. Also at this stage, applicants must be able to 
raise a prima facie case that the law treats the class to which they belong less 
favourably than one or more comparable classes. As for limb (b), the present rational 
relation requirement should be replaced by a more rigorous proportionality analysis, 
which would require the court to consider if the difference in treatment established 
by the law has a legitimate object, if there is a rational connection between the 
differential treatment and the object, and if the law infringes equality no more than is 
necessary to achieve the object. This would strike a more equitable balance between 
the protection of individual rights and other societal interests. 
Under such a modified test, a court would have to take into account some of 
those matters which the CA in Lim Meng Suang regarded as ‘extra-legal’ and thus 
irrelevant to its decision. In Tan Eng Hong, the plaintiff argued that ‘because 
homosexuality was not an incontrovertible immorality and did not harm public order, 
the advancement of morality as the underlying justification for s 377A was not a 
sound social object’. 173  The HC judge countered this by opining the plaintiff’s 
argument was ‘ultimately premised on the notion that Parliament is not allowed to 
legislate on an issue where the morality of that issue is controversial’, and said ‘that… 
cannot be right’.174 However, I believe the plaintiff’s argument was more subtle. His 
point was that Parliament should only be permitted to legislate on the basis of 
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contested morality if some additional element, such as harm to public order, is likely 
to eventuate. 
In my view, this is the nub of the challenges to the constitutionality of section 
377A: under Article 12(1) of the Constitution, is mere moral disapproval without 
more a legitimate object of a statute creating criminal liability? An examination of 
this issue is beyond the scope of this article,175 but it may be pointed out that a 
positive answer to the question would mean that the Parliament is entitled to 
criminalize conduct ranging from using contraception to wearing revealing clothes 
simply on the ground that such conduct is perceived to be immoral. Whether the 
Parliament should have such broad power is clearly a fraught issue, but one that I 
would submit the CA must confront when fulfilling its duty to judicially review the 
actions of the political branches of government. 
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